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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20061068-CA
ANDREW E. HOOPER,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from second- and thirddegree felony convictions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a~3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
POINT I: Where the defendant causes a two-car traffic accident behind which
traffic builds up, and another driver's unforeseen and criminally negligent inattention
causes his semi-truck to plow into the rear of the stopped traffic, did the sentencing court
violate the defendant's due process right to be sentenced only upon relevant information
when it determined the defendant's prison sentence based in large part upon the harm
caused by the semi-truck crash?
Standard of Review: Whether due process requirements were satisfied at
sentencing presents a question of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness
with no deference paid the trial court's conclusion. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241,
If 9, 31 P.3d 615 (quoting State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, f 9, 27 P.3d 573); State v.

Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1073 (Utah 1993) (reviewing from a correctness perspective the
issue of whether information relied on at sentencing was unreliable and considered at
sentencing in violation of due process). "Subsidiary factual determinations" are reviewed
under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, % 11, 95 P.3d
302 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 n.3 (Utah 1991)). A due process
violation at sentencing requires reversal unless the violation is harmless. See Wanosik,
2001 UT App 241, at ^36.
Preservation: The defendant moved at the sentencing hearing to strike from the
Presentence Report (PSR) (located in the record on appeal in the envelope marked R. 71)
all mention of the accident caused by the truck driver, along with any statements from
persons affected by the crash he caused. R. 84:3-5. The defendant objected to allowing a
person affected by the semi-truck crash to speak at the defendant's sentencing hearing.
R. 84:13. The sentence-hearing transcript, R. 84, is attached hereto as Addendum B.
POINT II; Where a sentencing court erroneously determines that the harm
caused by another actor's unforeseen and criminal behavior is relevant to the defendant's
sentence, and erroneously determines that the presentence investigation report (PSR)
accurately attributes the harm caused by said unforeseen and criminal behavior to the
defendant, did the trial court violate section 77-18-l(6)(a) by refusing to remove from the
PSR any reference to this irrelevant and inaccurate information?
Standard of Review: "' Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal
duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in sentencing reports
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is a question of law that we review for correctness.'" State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App, ^f
23, 94 P.3d 295 (quoting State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, \ 13, 6 P.3d 1133).
Preservation: The defendant argued that it was not correct to say he caused the
semi-truck crash, nor that the harm caused by that crash was relevant to determining his
sentence. R. 84:3,4.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005), § 41-6a-503 (2005), § 76-3-401 (2003) § 765-207 (Supp. 2006), and § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2006) are attached as Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant initially was charged by information with two counts of automobile
homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006), two counts of driving
under the influence and causing serious bodily injury in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6a-502 (2005), one count of keeping an open container in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6a-526 (2005), and one count of driving the wrong way on a one-way road in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-709 (2005). R. 1-3. He subsequently was charged
by amended information with one count of automobile homicide, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006), and one count of driving under
the influence and causing serious bodily injury, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005). R. 51-52.
The defendant pleaded guilty to the two counts alleged in the amended
information. R. 47.

3

On October 20, 2006, the defendant was sentenced to prison for a term of from
one to fifteen years on the second degree felony, and from zero to five years on the third
degree felony. R. 68. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. R. 69. The
Minutes: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 68-70, are attached hereto as Addendum
A.
On November 15, 2006, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. R. 72-73.
Pursuant to two motions for thirty-day extensions granted by this court, the defendant's
opening brief is due April 2, 2007.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Defendant's Accident.
Sometime before 5 p.m., on June 18, 2005, the defendant entered 1-80 at the 7200

West interchange driving west in the eastbound lanes. PSR at 2-3. Upon realizing his
mistake, the defendant continued driving west at 30 mph in what would be the left lane
for eastbound drivers. Id. at 3.
An eastbound Saturn automobile was driving erratically. Id. at 4. (twice slowing
to where it was overtaken by a car traveling 75 mph, only to accelerate ahead of the car at
a "rapid pace"). The Saturn was in the left lane. Id. Ahead of the Saturn, a bus changed
from the right lane to the left lane. Id. This forced the Saturn to brake. Id. The bus
changed back to the right lane and thus avoided the westbound defendant. Id. The
Saturn continued in the left lane, and collided head-on with the defendant. Id.
The driver of the Saturn and the front-seat passenger were both hospitalized in
critical condition. M a t 3. Each died in the days that followed. Id. One backseat
4

passenger was seriously injured. Id. The other backseat passenger suffered minor
injuries. Id. Blood drawn some four hours after the collision measured the Saturn
driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) at 0.17 gm./lOO ml. blood. Id.
The defendant was hospitalized in fair condition. His BAC was measured at .15
gm. less than four hours after the collision. Id. There existed evidence that the
defendant's mistake may have been related, in part, to a prior-existing seizure condition.
SeeR. 84:5-6,7-8.
B.

The Semi-Truck Crash.

It was clear and sunny the afternoon of June 18th.1 The defendant's accident
occurred before 5 p.m. See PSR at 2 (state troopers arrived at the scene at 5:03 p.m.). By
5:30 p.m., traffic on eastbound 1-80 was backed up for approximately 1.45 miles behind
the defendant's accident. Id. at 4.
At approximately 5:30 p.m., a semi-truck crashed into the backed up traffic. Id.
In the ensuing mayhem caused by the semi-truck's failure to slow or stop, three persons
died, and nine more were injured. Id.

1

Weather Underground, History for Salt Lake City, Utah, Saturday, June 18, 2005
(attached as Addendum D; visibility was ten miles or more all day long); U.S. Naval
Observatory, Salt Lake City, Utah, Rise and Set for the Sun for 2005 (attached as
Addendum E; adding one hour for daylight time, the sun set at 9:21 p.m. on June 18,
2005). This court may take judicial notice of these geographical facts pursuant to Utah
R. Ev. 201(b), (d) (2006). See, e.g., Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 116,
125 (Utah 1930) (Bramel, Dist. J., sitting by designation, concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("[The Utah Supreme Court] takes judicial notice of the general geography of this
state, of its history, and of the general facts of its agricultural condition and development
and of how classes of men earn their bread. In short, a court is presumed to know what
every man of ordinary intelligence must know about such things.")
5

The truck driver had exceeded federal driving-time restrictions by from .25 hours
to 2.25 hours at the time of the crash. Id. An investigation by state officials found
nothing wrong with the semi-truck before the crash. Id.
The truck driver was charged with three counts of negligent homicide, each a class
A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (2003). The electronic
docket from State v. Dalrymple, Case No. 051906928 (3d Jud. Dist. Ct, Salt Lake
County), is attached hereto as Addendum F. Following a one-day bench trial, the truck
driver was found guilty on all three counts. Addendum F at 4-5. The truck driver was
sentenced to three one-year terms of incarceration. Id. at 6-7. The three terms were
imposed consecutively. Id. at 6. The jail sentences were suspended and probation
imposed. Id. at 7.
C.

The Sentencing Hearing,

The Utah Division of Adult Probation and Parole prepared and submitted the PSR
in this case prior to the defendant's sentencing hearing. See R. 71. The PSR references
and describes the semi-truck accident on three pages.
•

Page four of the PSR describes the semi-truck accident, which, according to the
PSR, "resulted] from the defendant's actions."

•

Page five of the PSR notes the semi-truck driver's criminal convictions and
sentence imposed as a result of the semi-truck crash.

•

Page nine of the PSR reproduces a letter written by the daughter of one of the
persons killed by the truck driver's criminal negligence. PSR at 9. The letter
itself is contained in the court file, at R. 61. According to the daughter, her father
6

"would still be with us if Mr. Hooper had not set off this terrible chain of events.5'
Id. While urging imposition of the "maximum sentences" on the defendant, it
urges "mercy" for the semi-truck driver: "In the court sentencing for our accident,
we plead for mercy for Mr. Dalrymple, the truck driver, but for Mr. Hooper, we
plead for justice." Id.
Defense counsel moved to strike these references to the semi-truck crash, arguing
that the truck driver's failure to stop constituted a superseding cause, and the truck
driver's criminal negligence caused the three deaths and nine injuries. R. 84:3-4.
Because the truck driver's failure to stop was the single proximate cause of that crash,
argued defense counsel, the deaths and injuries that followed should not be attributed to
the defendant. Id.
The sentencing court denied the motion as to the description of the truck crash and
the letter from the daughter of one of a truck-crash victim, set for in the PSR at pages 4
and 9. R. 84:4.
The court, however, granted the motion to strike only as to the note regarding the
truck driver's criminal prosecution on page 5 of the PSR. R. 84:4.
Defense counsel twice objected to permitting comments at the sentencing hearing
from a man whose daughter and daughter-in-law were killed by the truck driver's
criminal negligence. R. 84:4-5, 13. The sentencing court overruled both objections. R.
84:5, 13. The man gave a very emotional account of his losses, and he attributed them to
the defendant. See R. 84:13-15.

The PSR made no recommendation about running the defendant's two sentences
concurrently or consecutively. See PSR at 1. The prosecution recommended that they
run concurrently. R. 84:16. Defense counsel argued that they run concurrently. R.
84:18-19. The court ordered them to run consecutively. R. 69.
D.

The Court and Prosecutor Blame the Defendant for the SemiTruck Crash,

In response to defense counsel's motion to strike reference to the semi-truck crash
from the defendant's PSR, the district court, Leslie A. Lewis, presiding, responded that
the accident occurred "[t]hanks to him," meaning the defendant. R. 84:3. The court
further opined about the semi-truck crash, "[Tjhis is all because of your client. . . . If
your client hadn't caused the other accident, traffic wouldn't have been stopped and I
doubt if any other accident [inaudible]." Id. The court struck from the PSJR. the note
regarding the truck driver's criminal convictions, yet refused to strike either the PSR's
description of the semi-truck crash, or the letter from the daughter of a man killed by the
truck driver's criminal negligence. R. 84 at 4.
In response to defense counsel's first motion to prohibit a man from testifying
about the deaths of his daughter and daughter-in-law who were killed as a result of the
truck driver's criminal negligence, the court declared: "I'm sorry, but I view this as
linked. I don't think that [semi-truck] accident would have occurred but for your client's
conduct." R. 84:5.
In response to defense counsel's second objection to allowing the man aggrieved
by the deaths of his daughter and daughter-in-law in the semi-truck crash to speak, the
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court reiterated: "Well, once again I will say very clearly that none of this would have
occurred but for your client's conduct." R. 84:13.
In response to defense counsel's observation that the PSR did not address
concurrent versus consecutive sentences, the court observed, "We're not talking about
one life, we're talking about three to five lives." R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 3
(addressing the two fatalities from the defendant's accident). The court also referenced
the defendant as one "who wipes out all these vehicles[.]" R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 23 (defendant's accident damages only one other vehicle).
The prosecutor lumped together the defendant's accident and the semi-truck crash
in discussing the victims of each: "I have never met a more decent group of people than
the victims of these cases." R. 84:16 (emphasis added). The prosecutor argued for
prison based, in part, upon the deaths and one particular injury caused by the truck
driver's criminal negligence:
This didn't just affect these two families, it affected the families of everyone
killed, of everyone -there's a 16 year old girl, I don't even know if this was
mentioned, there was a 16 year old girl who was injured in the trucking
accident who was paralyzed from the - probably 17 now - from the neck
down. There are countless other people from Highway Patrol Troopers to
those who stopped on the road to lend assistance that are affected by Mr.
Hooper's crime.
R. 84:16-17.
The prosecutor conceded that the defendant's accident was not the legal cause of
the semi-truck crash, and yet attributed the consequences of that "malay" [sic] to the
defendant:

9

Regardless of whether they can say that it was a direct result or if it was an
incident that happened on 1-80 that was just a maylay [sic], talking with
Highway Patrol Troopers who were choking back tears at our trial when [the
truck driver] was sentenced was the worst thing he had ever seen in his life.
And this was - we feel a result of Mr. Hooper, whether or not we can charge
this as a crime, I believe it is immaterial to the fact that it was his - it was
his responsibility.
R. 84:17.
Also in the course of the hearing, the sentencing court implied that the defendant
was a "monster." R. 84:8. It described the incident as "the most unconscionable,
outrageous conduct I have seen in a long time." R. 84:20. It concluded the hearing as
follows: "Mr. Hooper, I don't even have the words to describe what I think of you and
your conduct. So perhaps I'll [inaudible]. You deserve to go to prison right now and
stay for the rest of your natural life. Put him in cuffs." R. 84:21.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: The court violated the defendant's due process rights by basing its
sentence upon irrelevant information.
The defendant herein caused a two-car collision and ultimately pleaded guilty to
offenses based thereon. In the half hour following the defendant's collision, traffic
backed up for approximately 1.45 miles as medical and law enforcement personnel
responded to the scene. On this clear sunny afternoon, the driver of a semi-truck plowed
into the rear of the stopped traffic, killing three persons and injuring nine more. The
truck driver was convicted for causing these deaths through his criminally negligent
inattention.
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At defendant's sentencing hearing, the only issue was whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences. Both defense counsel and the state recommended
concurrent sentences. The court, however, focused almost exclusively upon the harm
caused by the semi-truck crash and imposed consecutive sentences.
That a professional driver on a clear afternoon would plow into a line of stopped
traffic was not a foreseeable result of the defendant's offense. The truck driver's
independent and unforeseen criminal negligence constitutes a superseding cause of the
semi-truck crash. A superseding cause means the defendant was not responsible for that
crash. That crash and the consequent harm, therefore, were irrelevant to the statutory
factors properly considered when deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences.
Due process requires that a sentence be based upon relevant information. The trial
court violated the defendant's due process rights by imposing consecutive sentences
based upon a crash for which the defendant was not responsible. By so doing, the court
abused its discretion. This abuse was not harmless.
Pursuant to the due process violation, the defendant's sentence may be vacated
and this case remanded for resentencing based only upon relevant factors. Pursuant to
Ut. R. App. P. 11(h) this court may instruct the trial court to remove all misstatements
about the defendant's alleged responsibility for the semi-truck accident from the record.
POINT II: The trial court violated section 77-18-l(6)(a) when it refused to
remove irrelevant and inaccurate information from the presentence report (PSR).
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Section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires a sentencing court to resolve on the record any
challenges to the accuracy or relevancy of sentencing factors set forth in the PSR.
In this case, the defendant objected to the PSR because the semi-truck crash was
irrelevant to determining an appropriate sentence, and because statements making the
defendant responsible for the semi-truck crash were inaccurate. The court found that the
semi-truck crash was relevant to determining the defendant's sentence, and that it was
accurate to attribute that crash and consequent harm to the defendant.
However, as established in Point I of this brief, the semi-truck crash was not
relevant to determining an appropriate sentence. Nor was it accurate to say the defendant
caused that crash and consequent harm.
As a result of the sentencing court's misapplication of section 77-18-l(6)(a), this
case may be remanded to remove from the PSR all reference to the semi-truck crash.
Because the court's focus on the semi-truck crash also affected the defendant's sentence,
the court on remand may revise the defendant's sentence accordingly.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS BY RUNNING HIS SENTENCES
CONSECUTIVELY BASED IN LARGE PART UPON THE SEMITRUCK CRASH.

Because the defendant did not cause the semi-truck crash, that crash and
subsequent harm are irrelevant to determining the defendant's sentence.
c

"[S]o long as basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural

fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad discretion in considering any and all
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information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence.5" State v. Johnson, 2006
UT App 3, If 7, P.3d 282 (quoting State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (quotations and citations omitted)). Where, however, the sentencing court does not
afford the defendant "'basic constitutional safeguards of due process and procedural
fairness,'" no discretion is due. Patience, 944 P.2d at 389 (quoting State v. Sweat, 722
P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986)); see also State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (inherent unfairness in the sentencing process constitutes abuse of discretion)
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
Due process requires that a sentence be based upon "reasonably reliable and
relevant information." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (citing Utah
Const. Art. I, § 7)). "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when, among other
things, it fails to consider all legally relevant factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8,
40 P.3d 626. It follows that a trial court also abuses its discretion when it considers
irrelevant factors. See id; see also State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980)
(holding that "fundamental fairness" requires that a sentence be based only upon
"accurate information").
In particular, due process prohibits determining a sentence based upon a crime for
which a defendant is not responsible. See Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 n.2; see also United
States v. Hack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[G]iv[ing] significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor" is unreasonable); United States v. Burgos, 276 F.3d 1284,
1288 (11th Cir. 2001) (giving weight to a sentencing factor irrelevant to legislative
guidelines constitutes abuse of discretion); State v. McFadden, 638 S.E.2d 633, 634 (N.C.
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App. 2007) ("If the record discloses that the court considered irrelevant and improper
matters in determining the severity of the sentence, the presumption of regularity is
overcome, and the sentence is in violation of the defendant's rights" (quoting State v.
Boone, 239 S.E.2d 459, 465 (N.C. 1977)).
The premium on reliability and relevance is especially high in the sentencing
context when "specific factual issues must be resolved." State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d
1064, 1071 (Utah 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Tryba, 2000
UTApp230,Tfl9, 8P.3d274.
As detailed below, a subsequent accident caused by the unforeseen criminal action
of another actor is not relevant to determining the defendant's sentence (§ A). Because
due process requires that a sentence be based only upon relevant information, the court's
reliance upon the semi-truck accident constitutes an abuse of discretion (§ B). The
court's violation of the defendant's due process rights at sentencing was not harmless (§
C).
A.

The Semi-Truck Crash and Its Consequences Were Irrelevant to the
Defendant's Offense and Sentence,
The sentencing court's finding that the defendant caused the semi-truck crash was

clearly erroneous, and the sentencing court erred in concluding the crash was relevant to
the defendant's sentence.2
2

The evidence that the defendant caused the semi-truck crash is best summarized as, if
the defendant had not caused a traffic back up, then there would have been no stopped
traffic for the criminally negligent truck driver to plow into:
•

The defendant's accident on westbound 1-80 occurred before 5 p.m. See PSR at 2
(state troopers arrived at the scene at 5:03 p.m.).
14

1. Where the only issue is whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences, relevant sentencing factors include "the gravity and circumstances
of the offense, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2).
In Utah, general factors relevant to determining a sentence include
"rehabilitation," "deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation." Rhodes, 818
P.2d at 1051 (citing Scott W. Rodgers, Binding Sentencing Guidelines: A Means of
Controlling Utah's Prison Population, 1990 Utah L.Rev. 309 (1990)).
When determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive prison sentences,
a court must consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offense, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). Utah appellate courts will overturn imposition of consecutive
sentences where a sentencing court fails to adhere to the criteria set forth in section 76-3401(2). Kg, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998), State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236,
244-45 (Utah 1995); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 1993).
To assist in imposing an "appropriate" sentence, the court may receive testimony
from a crime victim regarding "the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offensef.]" Utah Const, art. I, § 27 (Supp. 2006). In the context of
•

By 5:30 p.m., traffic on eastbound 1-80 backed up for approximately 1.45 miles
behind the defendant's accident. Id. at 4.
• At approximately 5:30 p.m., the semi-truck crashed into the backed up traffic. Id.
In the ensuing mayhem caused by the semi-truck's failure to slow or stop, three
persons died, and nine more were injured. Id.
• Based upon the truck driver's failure to slow before reaching the stopped traffic
on this clear, sunny day, he was charged with, and found guilty of, three counts of
negligent homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (2003). The
electronic docket from State v. Dalrymple, Case No. 051906928 (3d Jud. Dist.
Ct, Salt Lake County), is attached hereto as Addendum F.
15

'sentencing' hearings conducted by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, a "victim" is a
person directly affected by a particular "offense":
"Victim" means:
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or class A
misdemeanor offense, and regard which offense a hearing is held under this
chapter; or
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the offense
for which a hearing is held under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (13) (2003). See State v. Labrum, 870 P.2d 902, 908 (Utah
1993) (comparing judicial imposition of sentence with the Board's initial calculation of a
release date, and concluding, "parole is sentencing").
The defendant herein was convicted of one count of automobile homicide, and one
count of driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. R. 47. Pursuant
to the foregoing legal principles, the defendant is responsible for the harm and damage he
caused to the single car with which he collided, and for injuries suffered by the occupants
of that car. This damage and harm are relevant to whether the defendant should receive
concurrent or consecutive sentences because they relate to the "the gravity and
circumstances of the [defendant's] offense, the number of victims, and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2)
(2003).
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2. The semi-truck crash constitutes a superseding cause directly flowing from
the criminally negligent inattention of the truck driver, and is irrelevant to
the defendant's sentence.
In contrast to the defendant's responsibility for the two-car accident caused by his
offense, the defendant was not responsible for the harm caused by the truck driver's
superseding criminal acts.
In Utah, in both criminal and civil contexts, the "uniformly recognized" definition
of proximate cause is "the cause which through its natural and foreseeable consequence,
unbroken by any sufficient intervening cause, produces the injury which would not have
occurred but for that cause." State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980). "[W]here
the death or injury caused by the defendant's conduct is a foreseeable and natural result
of that conduct, the law considers the chain of legal causation unbroken and holds the
defendant criminally responsible." State v. Browne, 854 A.2d 13, 22 (Conn. App. 2004)
(quoting State v. Wassil, 648 A.2d 548 (Conn. 1995).
However, an intervening cause supersedes the defendant's criminal responsibility
when it is "unforeseeable and one in which the defendant does not participate^]" State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1215 (Utah 1993) (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 6, at 363 (1991));
see also State v. Judge, 675 P.2d 219, 226 (Wash. 1984) ("[T]o escape liability,
defendant would have to show contributory negligence was a supervening cause without
which her negligence would not have caused the accident"). Discussed below are two
cases in which the defendants should have foreseen the harm their acts caused, and one in
which the harm was not foreseeable and thus was attributable to a superseding cause.
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In State v. Hamblin, the defendant was drag racing his brother, ran a stop sign, and
killed the driver of a car in the intersection who had the right-of-way. 676 P.2d 376, 377
(Utah 1983). The Court concluded that while the victim's behavior might have been a
"concurrent" cause of the accident, the defendant was legally responsible because he was
going too fast to stop for an intersection at which it was foreseeable that a driver with the
right-of-way would be present. Id. at 379.
In State v. Hallett, during a night of partying, the defendant bent over a stop sign
so that the sign was not visible to northbound traffic. 619P.2d at 337. The next
morning, a northbound driver proceeded through the intersection and was broadsided by
another car that enjoyed the right-of-way. The northbound driver died from the
consequent injuries. Id. The defendant argued he was not legally responsible for the
northbound driver's death because that driver might have been driving faster than the 25mile-per-hour limit. Id. at 338. Noting that even a speeding driver might have stopped at
the intersection had the stop sign been visible, the Court found the northbound driver
was, at most, a concurrent cause of the accident. See id. The defendant was legally
responsible because the northbound driver's failure to stop at the intersection was the
foreseeable result of vandalizing the stop sign. Id. at 339.
The plaintiff in Bansasine v. Bodell brought suit on behalf of the passenger in a car
who was shot and killed by the driver of a second car. 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App.
1996). In response to aggressive driving by the second driver, the driver of the victim's
car tailgated the second car, flashed its bright lights at the second car, and sped by the
second car. Id. When the second car then pulled along side the victim's car, the victim
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made an obscene gesture at the second driver. Id. The second driver pulled a gun, and
shot and killed the victim. Id. On behalf of the victim, the plaintiff sued both the driver
of the victim's car and the driver of the second car claiming their negligence caused the
victim's death. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the driver of
the victim's car, concluding that the second driver's use of a gun constituted a
superseding cause of the victim's death, thereby absolving the first driver of liability for
his negligent behavior. Id.
In Bansasine, this court observed the basic definition of proximate cause, and
added, "'[Proximate cause] is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily sets in
operation the factors that accomplish the injury.'" 927 P.2d at 676 (quoting Clark v.
Farmer Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). It noted that
identifying the proximate cause of an injury becomes a question of law "'where
reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the evidence on
proximate causation.'" Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d
482, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). This court then described a superseding cause as
including a more recent criminal act that was unforeseeable to the prior actor:
Utah courts have consistently recognized that " c a more recent negligent [or
criminal/intentional] act may . . . relieve the liability of a prior negligent
actor under the proper circumstances.'" Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488 (citation
omitted). These circumstances arise when the more recent negligent or
criminal act was unforeseeable to the first negligent actor. Id. If, on the
other hand, the subsequent criminal or negligent act was "foreseeable to the
prior actor, both acts are concurring causes and the prior actor is not
absolved of liability." Id.; see also Mitchell [v. Pearson Enterprises, 697
P.2d 240,] 246 (Utah 1985).
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Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 677 (bracketed citation added; other alteration in original);
compare State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 543 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Steffensen to
arrive at the same definitions of superseding cause and concurrent cause in the criminal
context, and also noting the issue turns on foreseeability).
Applying these standards to the facts of Bansasine, this court affirmed the first
driver's dismissal, concluding that while his rude driving indeed set in motion the events
leading to the victim's death, it was not reasonably foreseeable that another driver would
shoot someone in response to rude driving. Id. at 677. It observed, "If such a response
were so common as to make it foreseeable, the streets and highways of this country
would be empty." Id. It concluded, "[T]he shooting was an extraordinary reaction to
rude driving, thereby making the result unforeseeable [to the driver of the victim's car]."
Id. n2.
This case most resembles Bansasine. Like the driver of the victim's car in
Bansasine, the defendant's offense herein constituted a link in the chain of events leading
up to the semi-truck crash. However, a professional semi-truck driver, more than thirty
minutes after the defendant's accident, failing to notice a 1.45 mile traffic jam on a clear
sunny day, and plowing his truck into the rear of the stopped cars, is no more foreseeable
than a driver firing a gun at another car because of rude behavior and obscene gestures.
If such inattention by professional truck drivers occurred frequently enough to be
foreseeable, imagine the carnage that would litter our roadsides every time traffic backed
up because of a red light or stop sign, highway construction, or rush hour.
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B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Imposing Consecutive
Sentences Based upon the Irrelevant Semi-Truck Crash.

Due process requires that a sentence be based upon relevant, not irrelevant,
information. See Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 & n.2. Basing a sentence upon harm caused
by the unforeseeable, independent, criminal negligence of another actor constitutes the
epitome of inherent unfairness, and thus an abuse of discretion. See Rhodes, 181 P.2d at
1051.
The truck driver caused the semi-truck crash through his independent and
unforeseeable criminal negligence, not the defendant. Supra Point I, § A(2). Thus the
harm flowing from the semi-truck crash has no more relevance to the "gravity and
circumstances" of the defendant's offense than a third crash 1.45 miles away and thirty
(plus) minutes later on another highway would have. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2).
The defendant is not responsible for the victims of the truck driver's unforeseeable
criminal negligence. See id. Nor should the defendant's "history, character, and
rehabilitative needs" be evaluated based upon harm caused by another's unforeseen
negligence. See id.
Punishing the defendant for harm that is irrelevant to his offense, and for a
criminal act he did not commit, is inherently unfair and violates due process. Therefore,
the trial abused its discretion.
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C.

The Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion Was Not Harmless.

The trial court's abuse of discretion requires the sentence to be vacated unless it is
harmless. See Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at ^ 36.3 The following discussion establishes
that the court focused upon the irrelevant semi-truck crash in deciding to impose
consecutive sentences (§ 1), and this improper focus harmed the defendant (§ 2).
1. The semi-truck crash influenced the court's sentencing determination.
With contributions from the PSR and the prosecutor, the sentencing court tied the
defendant to the truck crash with a short rope.
The PSR, at 4, detailed the truck crash as the "continuation of events[ ] resulting
from the defendant's actions." The PSR, at 9, included the touching letter from the
daughter of a man killed in the truck crash. (That letter is in the court record at R. 61.)
The prosecutor lumped together the defendant's accident and the semi-truck crash
in discussing the victims of each: "I have never met a more decent group of people than
the victims of these cases." R. 84:16 (emphasis added). The prosecutor argued for
prison based, in large part, upon the deaths and one particular injury caused by the semitruck crash:
3

In Wanosik, the state urged this court to apply a plain error standard of review to the
defendant's Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) claim because it was not preserved at trial. 2001 UT
App 241 at *H 28 n. 11. Plain error requires the defendant to establish prejudice. State v.
Cruz, 2005 UT 45, U 16, 122 P.3d 543. Instead, this court in Wanosik applied a harmless
error standard of review to both the defendant's Rule 22(a) sentencing claim and his due
process sentencing claim. 2001 UT App 241 at ^ 28 n.l 1 (holding preservation was not
required to pursue a Rule 22(a) claim when the sentence at issue is illegal pursuant to
Rule 22(e)), ^j 33 (finding noncompliance with Rule 22(a) "was not harmless," vacating
the sentence, and remanding for resentencing); \ 36 (finding the due process violation in
sentencing "was not harmless"). As detailed in this section of the brief, the trial court's
abuse of discretion, i.e., violating the defendant's due process rights, caused harm.
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This didn't just affect these two families, it affected the families of everyone
killed, of everyone - there's a 16 year old girl, I don't even know if this was
mentioned, there was a 16 year old girl who was injured in the trucking
accident who was paralyzed from the - probably 17 now - from the neck
down. There are countless other people from Highway Patrol Troopers to
those who stopped on the road to lend assistance that are affected by Mr.
Hooper's crime.
R. 84:16-17.
The prosecutor conceded that the defendant's accident was not the legal cause of
the semi-truck crash, and yet attributed the consequences of that "malay" [sic] to the
defendant:
Regardless of whether they can say that it was a direct result or if it was an
incident that happened on 1-80 that was just a maylay [sic], talking with
Highway Patrol Troopers who were choking back tears at our trial when [the
truck driver] was sentenced was the worst thing he had ever seen in his life.
And this was - we feel a result of Mr. Hooper, whether or not we can charge
this as a crime, I believe it is immaterial to the fact that it was his - it was
his responsibility.
R. 84:17.
The sentencing court was the most adamant in insisting that the defendant herein
was responsible for the truck driver's criminally negligent inattention. It is significant
that, at the sentencing hearing, the only unresolved issue was whether to impose
consecutive or concurrent sentences. R. 84:18 (defense counsel conceding the defendant
will be sentenced to prison, and identifying the only issue as whether the sentences will
run concurrently or consecutively). The prosecutor also recommended concurrent
sentences. R. 84:16. The PSR did not recommend consecutive sentences. PSRatl
(recommending, without more, that "the defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison
for the term prescribed by law").
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The sentencing court, however, relied in large part upon the truck crash in
imposing consecutive prison terms over the prosecutor's recommendation. In response to
defense counsel's motion to strike reference to the truck crash from the defendant's PSR,
the court responded that the accident occurred "[t]hanks to him," meaning the defendant.
R. 84:3. Of the truck crash, the court declared: "[TJhis is all because of your client....
If your client hadn't caused the other accident, traffic wouldn't have been stopped and I
doubt if any other accident [inaudible]." Id.
Especially telling is the court's ready agreement to strike from the PSR the
paragraph describing the truck driver's three convictions based upon his criminal
negligence, but not the PSR's description of the semi-truck crash, fatalities and injuries,
or the letter from the daughter of a man killed in the semi-truck crash. R. 84:4. This
course cleanses the defendant's PSR of any mention of the truck driver's responsibility
for the semi-truck crash and ensuing harm, and yet leaves intact every reference to the
deaths, injuries and victim impact it caused along with the defendant's alleged causal
influence. Transparent is the court's rationale underlying these decisions.
Then, in response to defense counsel's first motion to prohibit a man from
testifying about the deaths of his daughter and daughter-in-law caused the semi-truck
crash, the court declared: "I'm sorry, but I view this as linked. I don't think that [semitruck] accident would have occurred but for your client's conduct." R. 84:5.
In response to defense counsel's second objection to allowing the man aggrieved
by the truck crash to speak, the court reiterated: "Well, once again I will say very clearly
that none of this would have occurred but for your client's conduct." R. 84:13.
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The court observed, "We're not talking about one life, we're talking about three to
five lives." R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 3 (addressing the two fatalities from the
defendant's accident). The court referenced the defendant as one "who wipes out all
these vehicles[.]" R. 84:19. Compare PSR at 2-3 (referencing damage only to his and
one other vehicle caused by the defendant's accident).
2. The court's improper focus caused harm.
Plainly obvious was the court's focus on the truck crash in weighing "the gravity
and circumstances of the offense, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant" in imposing consecutive sentences. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). This harmed the defendant in three ways.
a. Imposition of Consecutive Sentences. The court's focus on the truck crash in
imposing consecutive sentences harmed the defendant. While the PSR remained neutral
on the issue, defense counsel - and even the prosecutor - recommended concurrent
sentences. R. 84:18-19 (noting the PSR did not address the issue), 16 (confirming the
prosecutor's recommendation for concurrent sentences), 18 (defense counsel arguing for
concurrent sentences).
Despite this, the court imposed consecutive sentences. In so doing (as detailed
supra, Point I, § C(l)), the court based its sentencing decision in large part upon the truck
crash. In applying section 76-3-401(2), the court considered more than just the one other
vehicle damaged in the defendant's accident, and more than the two lives lost in that
accident, when evaluating the "gravity and circumstances, [and] the number of
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victims[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2); R. 84:19 (citing more than two lives lost and
more than one vehicle damaged in support of consecutive sentences).
The court also factored in the effects of the truck crash when evaluating the
defendant's "history, character, and rehabilitative needs[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-3401(2); see R. 84:19-21. To wit, the court effectively called the defendant a "monster,"
R. 84:8, described the incident as "the most unconscionable, outrageous conduct I have
seen in a long time," id. at 20, and voiced hope that the defendant die in prison: "Mr.
Hooper, I don't even have the words to describe what I think of you and your conduct.
So perhaps I'll [inaudible]. You deserve to go to prison right now and stay for the rest of
your natural life. Put him in cuffs." Id. at 21.
b. Effect on Release Date. The defendant will be harmed when facing the Board
of Pardons and Parole if he is forced to answer for three deaths and nine injuries that his
accident did not cause. The Board effectively is a sentencing authority. See Labrum, 870
P.2d at 908 ("parole is sentencing"). While the trial court sets the minimum sentence, the
Board actually determines when the offender will be released from prison. State v. Smith,
909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995). The Board relies upon the PSR. See e.g., Utah Code
Ann. § 77-27-13(2) (2003) (the Board "shall" receive the PSR); Labrum at 903 (noting
that at initial parole hearing, "the Board considered . . . the presentence investigation
report prepared for the sentencing judge"); Utah Sentencing Commission, Utah Sentence
and Release Guidelines, § Policy implicit in the guidelines ("Presentence investigations
are beneficial to the Board of Pardons and Parole"). In this case, detailed descriptions of
the mayhem, death and injury caused by the truck driver's criminal negligence, and
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emotional statements from victims of the truck crash, are contained in the file, R. 61,
84:13-15,andthePSRat4,9.
The Board also will affirmatively contact "victims" of the defendant's offense, and
their survivors, and invite them to speak at the hearing at which the defendant's release
date initially is set. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(2) (Supp. 2006), § 77-27-9.5(2)-(4)
(2003). Absent intervention by this court, said "victims" may include all those affected
by the truck crash. As illustrated by letters and statements, e.g., R. 61, 84:13-15, PSR at
9, persons victimized by the truck crash believe the crash was caused by the defendant,
and are prepared to provide gut-wrenching testimony about their losses.
Similarly, the Board may receive letters from the sentencing court especially
detailing the court's opinion regarding "the character of the offender or any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances connected with the offense for which the offender has been
convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (2003); see also Labrum, 870 P.2d at 907
("[T]he Board should evaluate the aggravating and mitigating circumstances noted by the
judge") (quoting Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines). In this case, the sentencing
court declared: "[I]t is my intention to write a letter to the Board of Pardons anytime [the
defendant] comes up for parole and indicate to the Board of Pardons that I don't think he
ought to be released one day early." R. 84:20. No speculation is necessary to understand
what the tone of those letters will be if this court does not correct the mistaken belief that
the defendant was responsible for the truck crash. The sentencing court believes the
defendant is a "monster," R. 84:8; it blames the defendant for both accidents, which it
describes as "the most unconscionable, outrageous conduct I have seen in a long time,"
27

id. at 20; and it hopes the defendant dies in prison: "You deserve to go to prison right
now and stay for the rest of your natural life." Id. at 21.
The Board enjoys "absolute discretion in parole decisions[.]" Labrum, 870 P.2d at
906. It necessarily considers the nature of the defendant's crime when setting a release
date. Id. at 908. If the defendant must still answer for the three deaths and nine injuries
caused by the truck driver's criminally negligent inattention, all of which will be
presented by the PSR, with probable amplification from the court's letters and emotional
victim testimony, declaring the defendant responsible for the semi-truck crash may not
reasonably be said to be harmless.
c. Legitimacy of Sentencing Process. The defendant's interests, as well as
important societal interests, are ill-served by a sentencing process infected by
consideration of unfair and inaccurate factors:
Beyond the issue of accuracy, there is also a concern for legitimacy that has
always animated due process doctrine in the criminal law.
The interests of both society and criminal offenders are best served
when fairness and accuracy are assured at all stages of the
sentencing and correctional process. An offender's perception of
fairness in the criminal justice system is thought to promote
rehabilitation. Accurate sentencing and parole decisions also further
society's interest in ensuring that offenders will be returned to
society neither sooner nor later than is appropriate.
Labrum, 870 P.2d at 910 (quoting Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in Presentence
Investigation Reports, 91 Yale L.J. 1225, 1241-42 (1982)).
Attributing the harm caused by the truck driver's unforeseen, extraordinary and
superseding criminal acts to the defendant is decidedly "unfair." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1215
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(holding a defendant liable for the unforeseen and extraordinary behavior is "unfair").
Insofar as the harm from the truck crash is irrelevant to the defendant's sentence,
attributing that harm to the defendant is also inaccurate. It is unreasonable to conclude
that this illegitimate attribution is harmless.
The defendant requests two forms of relief pursuant to the court's abuse of
discretion in violating the defendant's due process rights. First, when consecutive
sentences have been imposed based upon improper application of Utah Code Ann. § 763-401(2), the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing consistent
with the appellate court's decision. E.g., State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938-39 (Utah
1998) (remanding with instructions to consider relevant mitigating factors). Here, the
case may be remanded with instructions to resentence the defendant only based upon
relevant sentencing factors.
Second, this court on its own initiative, or the trial court on its, may order
misstatements in the record corrected even after the record on appeal has been certified:
If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or
accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the
appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct
that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a
supplemental record be certified and transmitted.
UtahR.App.P. 11(h) (2006).
The letter, R. 61, and the PSR at 4, 5, 9, misstate the defendant's responsibility for
the semi-truck crash. As noted immediately above, these misstatements were material to
the trial court's abuse of discretion in sentencing the defendant based upon irrelevant
information. This court, therefore, may direct that the district court, on remand, correct
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these portions of the record to remove these misstatements. Pursuant to the process
outlined in Rule 11(h), the trial court would "serve on the parties a statement of the
proposed changes," to which either party "may serve objections[.]" Utah R. App. P.
11(h). At that time no need would exist for a "supplemental record [to] be certified and
transmitted" back to this court. See id. Rather the trial court would proceed with
resentencing.
POINT II:

THE COURT VIOLATED SECTION 77-18-l(6)(a) IN
CONCLUDING THE PSR's ATTRIBUTION OF HARM
FROM THE SEMI-TRUCK CRASH TO DEFENDANT WAS
ACCURATE AND RELEVANT,

In response to the defendant's objections to the relevancy of the PSR's references
to the semi-truck crash, and the accuracy of the attributions of the harm from that crash to
the defendant, the sentencing court erred in finding the PSR to be both relevant and
accurate.
Upon objection to the accuracy of a PSR, section 77-18-l(6)(a) requires the
sentencing court to "make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record":
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing.
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant
an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the
report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot
be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy
on the record.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (the Utah Legislature amended this statue in its general
2007 session; subsection (6)(a), however, was not affected. UT Legis. 218 (2007)).
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The defendant's PSR three times references the semi-truck crash. Page four of the
PSR describes the semi-truck accident, which, according to the PSR, "resulted] from the
defendant's actions." Page five of the PSR notes the semi-truck driver's criminal
convictions and sentence imposed as a result of the semi-truck crash. Page 9 of the PSR
reproduces a letter written by the daughter of a person killed in the truck crash. The
original of this letter is located at R. 61.
Defense counsel objected to the PSR's references to the semi-truck crash on pages
4 and 5. R. 84:3 (arguing that the description of the truck crash was "not relevant to Mr.
Hooper's charges), 4 ("I think [the semi-truck crash] was an intervening crime that was
committed and has nothing to do with this case"). Defense counsel also objected to the
inclusion of the victim impact letter on page nine of the PSR. R. 84:4.
The court overruled the objection as to the crash's description and PSR's
attribution to the defendant all harm therefrom as set forth on page four. R. 84:4. It
overruled the objection to the letter describing two fatalities caused by the semi-truck
crash. Id. However, it sustained the objection as to the PSR's reference to the crash on
page 5, thus striking from the PSR only that the truck driver was criminally prosecuted
and convicted for causing three deaths as a result of his criminal negligence. Id.
In overruling the defendant's objection to those portions of the PSR that describe
the harm caused by the semi-truck crash and attribute that harm to the defendant, the
sentencing court necessarily reached two conclusions: First, that it was accurate to
attribute the semi-truck crash and subsequent harm to the defendant; second, that the
crash and harm were relevant to determining the defendant's sentence. See R. 84:3, 4, 5.
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In response to defense counsel's first attempt to strike reference to the semi-truck crash
from the defendant's PSR, the court responded that the accident occurred "[tjhanks to
him," meaning the defendant. R. 84:3. In response to defense counsel's second attempt,
the court declared: "I'm sorry, but I view this as linked. I don't think that Dalrymple
accident, for want of a better way to expressing it [sic], would have occurred but for your
client's conduct." R. 84:5.
As detailed in Point I, § C(2), of this brief, the court erred in finding accurate the
PSR's attribution of harm from the semi-truck crash to the defendant. Thus the court also
erred in finding that crash and harm were relevant to its determination of the defendant's
sentence. Id.
Two remedies are available for a court's mistaken application of section 77-18l(6)(a). First, where a defendant challenges the court's noncompliance with section 7718-l(6)(a), but not the sentence itself, the case may be remanded to correct the PSR. E.g.,
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, If 41, 973 P.2d 404 (noting objection to the court's
noncompliance with section 77-18-l(6)(a), but not to the resultant sentence), ^f 46
(remanding with instructions to comply). Where a defendant also challenges the resultant
sentence, the case may be remanded not only to correct the PSR, but also to "revise the
sentence accordingly." State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, \ 31, 94 P.3d 295.
The defendant in this case seeks remand to correct the PSR by removing all
references to the semi-truck crash, and also by removing all inaccurate attributions of
harm from the crash to the defendant. Additionally, because these inaccurate and
irrelevant factors influenced the court's determination of the defendant's sentence, supra,
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Point I, § C(l), the court on remand may re-determine the sentence absent consideration
of the semi-truck crash and consequent harm based upon the corrected record.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the sentencing court's unconstitutional reliance upon irrelevant
sentencing factors, the defendant requests that his sentence be vacated, and this case
remanded to remove from the record all reference to the irrelevant information, and to
conduct a new sentencing hearing at which only relevant factors are considered.
In the alternative, pursuant to the court's erroneous application of section 77-18l(6)(a), the defendant requests that this case be remanded to remove from the PSR all
inaccurate and irrelevant information, and to revise the defendant's sentence should the
court determine that revision is appropriate based upon the corrected record.
DATED t h i ^ ^ a y of April, 2007.
The Salt Lake-Legal Defender Asspciation

John Pace
Michael D. Misner
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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Defendant

Judge:
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V

PRESENT
Clerk:
chells
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney (s) : MISNER, MICHAEL D
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 23, 1942
Video
Tape Number:
11:21:33
CHARGES
1. AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 08/01/2006 Guilty
2. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 08/01/2006 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant' s conviction of AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
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.Case No: 051907365
Date:
Oct 20, 2006
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Count 2 is consecutive to count 1.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$5000.00
$0.00
$4275.00
$9275.00

Charge # 2
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$5000.00
$0
$4275.00
$9275.00
Plus Interest
Attorney Fees
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Pay fine to The Court.
The Court orders the defendant to pay full restitution for all the
victims. The State is to provide an amount owing in 45 days. The
Defense has 30 days to file an objection.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 20, 2006

2

HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

3

For the Plaintiff:

PATRICIA S. CASSELL

4

For the Defendant:

MICHAEL D. MISNER

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT: All right, let's do the Hooper case.

7

MS. CASSELL:

8

the victims.

9

some children.

10

Your Honor, in the foyer are some of

If I could get them.

Also the victims have

I said that you may not let them be here,

but-

11

THE COURT:

12

welcomed to be here.

If the children are quiet they're

13

MS. CASSELL:

Thank you.

14

THE COURT:

15

Okay, this is the time set for sentencing in the

I'll let you get them before we start,

16

matter of State v. Andrew Hooper, 051907365.

17

time set for sentencing.

18

report and an assessment - excuse me, that's on somebody

19

else.

20

read it very carefully.

21

This is the

I have reviewed a pre-sentence

I've reviewed the pre-sentence report twice now and
I'm conversant with its content.

Did you have that same opportunity, counsel?

1

MS. CASSELL :

2

THE COURT:

3
4

I am, Your Honor, that'rs right.

Are there any inaccuracies or omissions

in the report?
MR. MISNER:

Your Honor, there are no inaccuracies.

5

There are some things that. aren't there but we will certainly

6

point out to the Court as we go along.

7
8
9
10
11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Any legal reason ]known to you

why we should not proceed to sentencing?
MR. MISNER:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
And you've gone over the pre- sentence

report with your client?

12

MR. MISNER:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MISNER:

15

I really get started.

16

should not proceed with sentencing today.

17

asking the Court to not sentence Mr. Hooper today because our

18

request is going to be that the Court send him to the prison

19

for a diagnostic.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. MISNER:

I have.
I'm happy to hear your remarks.
Your Honor, a couple of things before
There are no legal reasons why we
I guess I am

I respectfully decline.
There are some things, although there

22

are no errors, there are certainly things I do not believe

23

should be in the report, and I'm going to ask the Court to

24

strike them.

25

THE COURT:

What would those be?

1
2

MR. MISNER:

On page 4, Your Honor, the paragraph

starting with the following information.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. MISNER:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
Going to the end of that section are

5

not relevant to Mr. Hooper's charges, his plea, or his

6

sentencing.

7

through them.

8

case, traffic is backed up because there are emergency

9

vehicles on the road.

And just to explain I'm sure the Court's been
While this investigation is going on in this

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. MISNER:

Thanks to him.
That's correct.

A truck driver comes

12

along and commits a crime.

13

trying to stop, rams into the back of the stopped traffic -

14
15

THE COURT:

Yeah, and this is all because of your

client.

16
17

He does not stop at all, he's not

MR. MISNER:

Well, it's because of the truck driver

who's already been convicted in a trial.

18

THE COURT:

I suppose that's one way of looking at

19

it.

If your client hadn't caused the other accident, traffic

20

wouldn't have been stopped and I doubt if any other accident

21

[inaudible].

22

MR. MISNER:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Basically it I'm not going to strike anything on

page 4.
MR. MISNER:

Well, and everything else that I would

1

ask the Court to strike I guess I just need to make a record

2

of it.

3

would also ask the Court to strike it the exact same thing

4

goes into that case and that sentence.

The next page, section D, investigator's comments, I

5

THE COURT:

6 I

MR. MISNER:

What case?
The case with the truck driver who

committed a crime.
THE COURT:
9 I considered?

10

And you don't want that to be

I thought you did want it to be considered.

MR. MISNER:

No, I think that was an intervening

11

crime that was committed and has nothing to do with this

12

case.

13
14
15

THE COURT:

I'll strike it on page 5.

Anything

else?
MR. MISNER:

I believe the last thing is page 9,

16

Your Honor, and that's collateral contacts is something that

17

totally is with regards to that as well, and I believe it's

18

not appropriate in this report.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MISNER:

I'm not changing that.
And I guess while we're on that same

21

issue just to make a record, my understanding is that there

22

is going to be somebody here who wishes to speak.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. MISNER:

25

I'm sure there are a number of people.
Well, one in particular that's here as

a result of that crime that was committed.

They're not a

1

victim in this case, there are no charges relating to that in

2

this case, and I would object to -

3

THE COURT:

I'm sorry, but I view this as linked.

4

I don't think that Dalrymple accident, for want of a better

5

way to expressing it, would have occurred but for your

6

client's conduct.

7

MR. MISNER:

I think the State would disagree

8

because they didn't charge Mr. Hooper with anything as they

9

couldn't because it was another separate crime.

I guess my

10

best way to make a record, Your Honor, is to me it would be

11

the same as if an officer had pulled you over for speeding

12

and was at your window writing you a ticket and somebody came

13

by and ran the officer over as he was writing a ticket -

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. MISNER:

16

No, I don't - and the officer's wife coming and

testifying against you.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. MISNER:

That's it with regards to that, Your

THE COURT:

All right, what else would you like to

19

Honor.

20
21
22

I don't see a that way.

say?
MR. MISNER:

Your Honor, the only things that were

23

left out of the report which were made available and aware to

24

the person writing the report, Mr. Hooper is on medication,

25

he has a seizure disorder. He's been to several doctors,

1

there's a medical history of it.

2

determine what causes these seizures, he blacks out, his

3

family has seen him have these seizures and the black-out

4

periods afterwards.

5

investigated for a DUI because he was in a single car

6

accident and he had a seizure basically and blacked out and

7

he had been in an accident.

8

the test -

9

He has - there was another time he was

THE COURT:

10

MR. MISNER:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. MISNER:

They've been unable to

They suspected a DUI.

When was that?

He did

Was that 11/10/87?

Your Honor, I'm not exactly sure.
I need to know.
It was not a DUI though, that's the

13

point, is they did a test and he had no alcohol in his

14

system.

15
16

THE COURT:

is that he does have five prior DUIs.

17
18

All right, well what's compelling to me

MR. MISNER:

He has - I have a 1978 DUI, Judge, a

1982 DUI, and a 1996 DUI.

19

THE COURT:

There's one in

%

86 that was reduced to

20

reckless; there was one in A87 although it says no

21

disposition known; and then there's one in ^96.

22
23

MR. MISNER:
one.

Yes, so we don't know about the

y

It may very well be the one that was not a DUI.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. MISNER:

That's what I just asked.
The ^86 case is not a DUI, it's a

81

1

reckless driving.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MISNER:

It started as a DUI.
The reason, I mean, what we're

4

pointing out is that he does have a medical condition that

5

has resulted in another accident.

6

THE COURT:

That results in DUIs?

7

MR. MISNER:

No, absolutely not.

8

denies his history of having DUIs, Judge.

9

THE COURT:

10

that way.

11

DUIs?

12
13

He in no way

Well, it certainly is coming across

What medical condition could contribute to these

MR. MISNER:

None, none, Your Honor, none

whatsoever.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. MISNER:

Then I don't know why it's relevant.
It's only relevant to show what his

16

current life situation is, which is one section in the

17

report, it just doesn't include this information.

18

certainly not an excuse.

19

time.

20

believe was .15.

He was under the influence at this

He had a blood test.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. MISNER:

And it's

His blood alcohol level I

That' right.
We believe he did have a seizure as

23 I well and it may have been caused by the alcohol and it's not
24

an excuse and it's not a defense.

25

the things he told the police afterwards were untrue as to

He does not remember this,

1

where he was coming from, Wendover and that sort of thing.

2

That sort of information is indicative that he probably had

3

another seizure.

4

a defense because he had drank too much and he was well over

5

the legal limit.

6

As I say, he's not excusing that, it's not

He has obviously his last crime, his last arrest,

7

his last charge is a DUI in 1996.

8

period as he indicated in the report, until he broke off a

9

relationship in 2005.

10
11

THE COURT:

He's been sober for some

Well, I'm not certain that's true.

All

we know is that he hasn't had a conviction since ^96.

12

MR. MISNER:

Of any kind.

Your Honor, I have

13

personally been in the position of the victims in this case.

14

I know what they're going through.

15

wasn't -

16
17

THE COURT:

MR. MISNER:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MISNER:

Have you lost somebody to death in a

Yes, I have.
I see.
I wasn't sure I could handle this

21

case.

22

wanted Mr. Hooper to be a monster.

23

easier.

25

I

traffic accident where someone was a drunk driver?

18

24

I know what this is.

I met Mr. Hooper, I went to see how this would go.

I

It would have been

He's not.
THE COURT:

of a monster.

Well, that depends upon your definition

1

MR. MISNER:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MISNER:

He's a sad old man who's an alcoholic.
Who's killed people.
He has and, in fact, when I first saw

4

him in the hall today that's the first thing he did was start

5

crying and said I have killed people and I've taken lives.

6

There is no way he's a flight risk.

7

go to trial.

8

remorse than any client I've every had.

9

11

MR. MISNER:

He has more

And so he should.
Absolutely.

He understands that,

Judge, he does, he gets it.

12
13

He could not deal with this issue.

THE COURT:

10

There's no way he could

THE COURT:

Well, he hasn't gotten it because he's

been engaged in the same drunken driving process since 1978.

14

MR. MISNER:

And like many other people we get in

15

here, Judge, it's the unfortunate thing of DUIs is that they

16

don't get it until something like this happens and it's not a

17

defense -

18

THE COURT:

Well, and I think our society has been

19

way too lenient in slapping people's hands when they have

20

multiple DUIs.

21

I'm not going to do that.

MR. MISNER:

And I certainly understand that,

22

Judge, but he is not here asking you today to walk out of

23

this courtroom.

24

remorseful for it and he just wants the record to reflect

25

exactly what is going on in his life and how he feels.

He understands what he's done.

He's

He

1

certainly, you know, understands what the Court is going to

2

do today.

3

Court to realize or to know that he is sorry, not like we

4

usually say, he gets it.

5
6

He understands what's going on.

THE COURT:

How can someone who kills people not be

sorry?

7

MR. MISNER:

8

THE COURT:

9

I just want the

I've seen it.
Well, okay, he's sorry.

Is there

anything else?

10

MR. MISNER:

Your Honor, just very briefly.

It's

11

not a defense, it's not an excuse, the difference between Mr.

12

Hooper and another person who might be in here getting a

13

sentence where this would be a normal DUI would be a second -

14

considered a second DUI for sentencing purposes.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MISNER:

No, it wouldn't.
In the two-year period this would be a

17

class B DUI if nobody wasn't injured, Your Honor.

The

18

mandatory minimum would be 10 days, and we're not asking for

19

that.

20

somebody that gets 1 to 15, and I won't say it's bad luck for

21

Mr. Hooper, it's good luck for the person who happens to not

22

get in an accident and kill somebody.

23

but just to make that distinction clear, if the driver of the

24

other vehicle were alive, he would be standing before you

The difference between somebody that gets 10 days and

Certainly no excuse,

25 J today for the same exact thing, a DUI on the site.

Mr.
10

1

Hooper

_

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MISNER:

4

THE COURT:

5

But he didn't kill anyone.
He was a drunk driver as well.
Yes, I understand that.

He had a

higher BA, in fact, he didn't kill anyone.

6

MR. MISNER:

Well, I mean, somebody died.

7

THE COURT:

He didn't cause the accident.

8

wasn't going the wrong way on a freeway.

9

confuse the facts of this case.

10
11

So let's not

Well, I mean, and like I said it's no

MR. MISNER:

defense , there certainly was comparative negligence.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MISNER:

14

He

It is no defense.
He certainly was partially responsible

for the accident.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MISNER:

I cannot find that at all.
He was traveling way in excess of the

17

speed limit and did not avoid the head-on collision that a

18

bus previously had.

19

you're driving drunk and somebody in your car dies -

20
21

But it would be a DUI homicide.

THE COURT:

You are trying to move the blame to

someone else -

22

MR. MISNER:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. MISNER:

25

If

We're not.
- but it's not selling well.
We are not in any way, Judge, we're

trying to show the difference between the end result is
11

1

what's going to control, and it's a sad thing.

2

to address the court, Judge.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HOOPER:

5

7

Mr. Hooper?

I wrote it all down.

Can I just give

I don't think I can -

it to you?

THE COURT:

6

Yes.

He does want

I don't want it but you can rejad it to

me if you'd like.

8

MR. HOOPER:

9

THE COURT:

Can I read it?
That's what I just said.

THE DEFENDANT: I am so sorry that it took this

10
11

terrible tragedy to prove how rotten alcohol really is.

12

[inaudible] that I promised everybody in heavenL and on earth

13

and in this courtroom today that I will never touch this junk

14

ever again.

15

I'm so sorry.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Is that the same speech that you made

16

before on your other priors?

17

THE DEFENDANT: No.

18

lately.

19
20

THE COURT:

I assume you said basically the same

thing -

21
22

This is something I wrote

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I probably did becuase I feel
the same.

23

THE COURT:

24

THE DEFENDANT: I just thought I wouldn't be able

25

But you -

to.
12

1
2

THE COURT:

Would the State like to be heard, Ms.

Cassell?

3

MS. CASSELL:

We would.

Your Honor, prior to the

4

[inaudible] I would ask in the courtroom present are Juan

5

Martinez's family.

6

to address the court.

7

I'm not sure that any of them even want

THE COURT:

8

briefly?

9

we'll get the floor.

Would anyone of you like to speak

The defendant is to move over to the jury box and

10

MS. CASSELL:

They have all spoken and I just don't

11

think that they can talk today.

12

Honor, is Carl Studs who is the father of one of the women or

13

people who was killed in the accident involving the truck.

14

He would like to speak and he's also spoken with the family

15

and -

However, also present, Your

16

THE COURT:

Anyone who wishes to speak [inaudible].

17

MR. MISNER:

Your Honor, just again for the record

18

this involves that subsequent accident.

19

no standing.

20

THE COURT:

We object, there's

Well, once again I will say very

21

clearly that none of this would have occurred but for your

22

client's conduct.

23

Yes, sir, I'd like to hear from you.

24

MR. ?:

25

I thank you for the opportunity.

I live on

a very short block or we did, there are eight houses on that
13

1

block.

Two houses up from me, the father of our friend and

2

neighbor was killed in that wreck.

3

killed.

4

daughter was killed.

5

time, well, all of you together to be friends.

6

friends for years.

7

physically or harm to him physically, but my understanding of

8

incarceration is that people are put there because they're a

9

danger to society or they cannot be - or they need

My house, my daughter was

Three houses down my daughter-in-law, which is my
Juan made mention when he came here one
We've been

I have no desire for Mr. Hooper to suffer

10

rehabilitation.

11

rehabilitated.

12

or was set free and let go today that again he would drive

13

and drink.

14

I don't believe that Mr. Hooper can be
It is my sincere belief that if he continued

I don't know how many people may have told him you

15

can't do that, you're going to hurt yourself, you're going to

16

hurt somebody else.

17

would ask the Court to extend the consecutive for him to be

18

put away as long as possible to keep him off the roads.

19

I believe he's a danger to society.

I

I again have, as I have met with the Martinezes

20

they are left without a father.

21

children that are concerned and care about him.

22

daughter, I no longer have her.

23 J

THE COURT:

24

MR. ?:

I realize Mr. Hooper has
I had a

I'm so sorry, sir.

She was a wonderful young lady, 29 years

25 J old, she left a three year old and a three month old.

She
14

1

was the sole support for that family.

2

manager for Alpine City Planner and quite a young lady.

3

not wish to have him harmed physically, but he cannot be on

4

the streets. He cannot be driving. He needs to be placed

5

where he has not - does not have that temptation of alcohol

6

and automobiles together, and again I thank you for this

7

opportunity.

8
9

THE COURT:

She was the assistant

I thank you for speaking out.

I do

So sorry

for your loss.

10

MR. ?:

I think of the Martinez family.

They no

11

longer have their father to direct them, to guide them, his

12

physical and emotion support.

13

no longer has her husband.

14

Mrs. Martinez is a widow who

And some comments were made about Mr. Hooper's -

15

not Mr. Hooper, Mr. Dalrymple.

16

He has a conscience and his life has been destroyed.

17

guilty?

18

But he wasn't drinking, wasn't on drugs, and he wasn't

19

speeding.

20

Your Honor.

Yes.

Mr. Dalrymple's a decent man.

He should have been [inaudible].

It was a horrible accident.

Was he

He wasn't.

But anyway thank you,

21

THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.

22

Would anyone else like to speak, and I urge you to

23

take the opportunity now if you'd like to.

24

from you.

25

MS. CASSELL:

I'd like to hear

I don't think anyone else would like
15

1

to speak, Your Honor.

2
3

THE COURT:

All right.

Ms. Cassell, I'm interested

in your response.

4

MS. CASSELL:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I became

5

involve in this case, Your Honor, immediately upon right

6

after it happened.

7

I screened it from the beginning.

8

decent group of people than the victims of these cases.

9

are, to a person not vindictive, not hateful, and they have

It happened, I think on Father's Day and
I have never met a more
They

10

lost more than any of us can ever imagine.

11

their fathers, their daughters, their children, their best

12

friends, and not any of them are vindictive and I've been

13

humbled by their - by them.

14

They've lost

Mr. Dalrymple (sic) should go to prison, period,

15

Your Honor.

We want him to go to prison.

He should to go

16

prison is for - we agreed with - and Mr. Misner will probably

17

mention this, we agreed that we would ask that these run

18

concurrently, but we would ask that he be sentenced to the 1

19

to 15.

20

protection of the community.

21

not the Martinezes, not countless other people.

22

just affect these two families, it affected the families of

23

everyone killed, of everyone - there's a 16 year old girl, I

24

don't even know if this was mentioned, there was a 16 year

25

old girl who was injured in the trucking accident who was

That's what he should go to prison in order for the
No one, not the [inaudible],
This didn't

16

1

paralyzed from the - probably 17 now - from the neck down.

2

There are countless other people from Highway Patrol Troopers

3

to those who stopped on the road to lend assistance that are

4

affected by Mr. Hooper's crime.

5

Regardless of whether they can say that it was a

6

direct result or if it was an incident that happened on 1-80

7

that was just a malay, talking with Highway Patrol Troopers

8

who were choking back tears at our trial when Mr. Dalrymple

9

was sentenced was the worst thing he had ever seen in his

10

life.

And this was - we feel a result of Mr. Hooper, whether

11

or not we can charge this as a crime, I believe it is

12

immaterial to the fact that it was his - it was his

13

responsibility.

14

Witnesses who came upon this who didn't - weren't

15

even part of the accident, their lives will be affected

16

forever.

17

Your Honor, we would ask that Mr. Hooper go to

18

prison for the protection of all so that this never happens

19

again, at least with respect to him and maybe it sends a

20

message to all those people who would drink and drive that

21

sometimes this happens you'll go to prison and you'll go to

22

prison for a long time because nobody deserves to have this

23

affect their lives like it did and on that, Your Honor, we

24

submit it.

25

THE COURT:

Thank you.
17

1

Mr. Misner, you're entitled to the last word.

2

MR. MISNER:

Thank you, Judge.

Your Honor, I

3

forgot there was one correction that I think we all need to

4

point out.

5

think that needs to be clear on the pre-sentence report that

6

this is not a third degree DUI as they have indicated.

Count 2 is DUI causing serious bodily injury.

I

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. MISNER:

9

Your Honor, I'd love to make myself feel better by

10

brow beating Adult Probation and Parole but that's not going

11

to help.

12
13

THE COURT:

I made that change.
Thank you.

Why would you brow beat them. I think

you've kind of got the wrong target here.

14

MR. MISNER:

15

going to happen here.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. MISNER:

No, Judge, I mean - we all know what's

It's AP&P's fault?
No, absolutely not.

We all know

18

what's going to happen here today.

We're not asking that Mr.

19

Hooper not go to prison.

20

Honor is not going to send for a diagnostic.

21

I would like a diagnostic is so the prison would know what to

22

do with him when he's there.

23

sentence is going to be.

24

sentence report in this case is should these be run

25

concurrent or be consecutive.

We understand he is.

I know Your

The only reason

But this case is clear what the

What's the only issue for a pre-

That's the only issue, and

it's not even addressed.
THE COURT:
MR. MISNER:
THE COURT:

I think it's addressed.
They don't put it any where in there.
Well, they may not address it, but in

my mind it's been addressed by the facts.

We're not talking

about one life, we're talking about three to five lives.
MR. MISNER:

I'm not going to beat that anymore,

Judge, I think we're talking about two.

We would certainly

ask THE COURT:
MR. MISNER:

As if two lives was not significant?
No, it is.

That's why Mr. Hooper is

going to prison.
THE COURT:

He'd be going to prison if it were a

third degree felony and he hadn't killed anyone.
of repeat DUIs.

I'm tired of them.

serious crime as if it is nothing.

I am tired

We have treated this
And what we get is

someone like this who wipes out all these vehicles, all these
human lives and who impacts so many people, and I don't know
what would have changed if he'd been held accountable on
others the way he should have been held accountable, but I
know what's going to happen today.
With reference to the automobile homicide, a second
degree felony, he's sentenced to the maximum.

He's sentenced

to the indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years at the Utah State
Prison.
19

1

In connection with the driving under the influence

2

of alcohol or drugs causing bodily injury, a third degree

3

felony, he's sentenced to the term of zero to five years, and

4

that is to run consecutive to the 1 to 15.

5

both sentences at the prison and it is my intention to write

6

a letter to the Board of Pardons anytime he comes up for

7

parole and indicate to the Board of Pardons that I don't

8

think he ought to be released one day early.

9

most unconscionable, outrageous conduct I have seen in a long

He'll be doing

This is the

10

time.

And what this tells me is that some people are just

11

not capable of learning.

12

loaded gun around and pointing it at people all the time and

13

he's not going to change.

14

I believe we decided, and this man - excuse me, 1962 is when

15

his record began.

16

have been alcohol related, and the first DUI was in ^78.

17

This is an appalling record, an appalling scenario.

18

people who have lost family members will never be the same.

19

So the sentence is not appropriate, it ought to be a greater

20

sentence, but it's the maximum I can impose.

21

It's as if he were carrying a

This goes all the way back to 1978

There was a hit and run in

A

62, that could

These

He is to pay restitution in full to all the victims

22

involved.

The State has 30 days or 45 days to gather the

23

information on that and the defense has 45 days to consider

24

it and file any objection they may have and ask for a hearing

25

if they deem it appropriate.

He's to pay a fine in the
20

amount of $5,000 plus an 85 percent surcharge, and he's to
pay a recoupment fee in the amount of $500 as part of his
punishment.
Mr. Hooper, I don't even have the words to describe
what I think of you and your conduct.
[inaudible].

So perhaps I'll

You deserve to go to prison right now and stay

for the rest of your natural life.
Put him in cuffs.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a
combination of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration
(1) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state
if the person:
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test shows that
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time
of the test;
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation or actual physical control.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-503. Penalties for driving under the influence violations
(1) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Section 41-6a-502 is
guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor; or
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated
the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense; or
(iii) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle
at the time of the offense.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Section 41-6a-502 is guilty of a third degree felony if:
(a) the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(b) the conviction under Section 41-6a-502 is within ten years of two or more prior convictions
as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2); or
(cont.)

(c) the conviction under Section 41-6a-502 is at any time after a conviction of:
(i) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001;
(ii) a felony violation of Section 41-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that
would constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or
(iii) any conviction described in Subsection (2)(c)(i) or (ii) which judgment of conviction is
reduced under Section 76-3-402.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences—LimitationsDefinition
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and
commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any
other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or
concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection
(6)(b).
(cont.)

(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed
prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207. Automobile homicide
(1) As used in this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes
any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.
(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person
operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation.
(b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is
subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2).
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or
similar circumstances.
(3)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person
operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another
and:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation.
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as
defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516
apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section.
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made
in accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(l).

(cont.)

(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense.
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is
admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyanceProbation— Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—ConfidentialityTerms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extensionHearings— Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement.
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime
or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of
class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is
with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is
vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall
be provided.
(cont.)

(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment
prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the
supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider
appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise
the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to
conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions.
However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in
accordance with department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of
time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department
or information from other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the effect of the crime on
the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council or for use by the department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and
the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in
the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge,
and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged
inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies
(cont.)

cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the
record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the
appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open
court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the
defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court
finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic
monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the
compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed
on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection
(8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(cont.)

(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21
during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 7727-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any
extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the
account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer
responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay
should not be treated as contempt of court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when
termination of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of
details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(1 l)(a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation
of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the
probationer is exonerated at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the
issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court.
(cont.)

(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated
the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the
conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall
determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation,
modification, or extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause
why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall
present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based
shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court
for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present
evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term
commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division
of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State
Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(cont.)

(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63- 2-403 and 63-2-404, the State
Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report.
Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department
may disclose the presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department
for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's
authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report
or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the
crime on the victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76- 3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement,
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in
accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as
described in this section until further order of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's
compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(cont.)

(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and
install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the
department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either
directly or by contract with a private provider.
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Daily Summary for June 18, 2005
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62°F/16°C
75°F/23°C
48 °F / 8 °C

7 0 ° F / 2 1 °C
83 °F / 28 °C
57°F/13°C

102°F/38°C(1940)
37°F/2°C(1928)
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1
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Temperature
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Moisture
Dew Point
Average Humidity
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Minimum Humidity
Precipitation

42°F/5°C
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Precipitation
Month to date precipitation
Year to date precipitation
Snow

0.00 in / 0.00 cm
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12.78

0.02 in / 0.05 cm 0.32 in/0.81 cm (1975)
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9.25
0.00 in / 0.00 cm
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0.00 in / 0.00 cm
0.0

T
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Snow Depth

-

Snow

10mph/15km/h(NNW)
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6/1
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_ _ _ ^
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Wind
Wind Speed
Max Wind Speed
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Light:
• Length

Sea Level Pressure
Sea Level Pressure

iMoon

Max Gust Speed
Visibility
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25mph/40km/h
10 miles /16 kilometers

T = Trace of Precipitation, MM = Missing Value

Source: NWS Daily Summary
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Hourly Observations
(MDT)

Tem

Perature

D e w Point

Humidity pJ^gJJJJ1

Visibility

Erection

Wind Speed

12:56
AM

55.0 °F /
12.8 °C

42-1 ° F /
5.6 °C

62%

29.64 in /
1003.7 hPa

10.0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

8.1 mph /
13.0 km/h /
3.6 m/s

1:56
AM

51.1 °F/
10.6 °C

42.1 ° F /
5.6 °C

71%

29.66 i n /
1004.2 hPa

10.0 miles /
16.1 kilometers

NNW

9.2 mph /
14.8 km/h /
4.1 m/s

2:56
AM

50.0 ° F /
10.0 °C

42.1 ° F /
5.6 °C

74%

29.66 in /
1004.4 hPa

10.0 miles /
16.1 kilometers

North

5.8 mph /
9.3 km/h /
2.6 m/s

3:56
AM

50.0 °F /
10.0 °C

41.0 ° F /
5.0 °C

71%

29.67 in /
1004.6 hPa

10.0 miles /
16.1 kilometers

North

4.6 mph /
7.4 km/h /
2.1 m/s

4:56

48.0 ° F /

39.9 °F /

29.67 in /

10.0 miles /

North

4.6 mph /
7.4 km/h /

74%

GustS

AM

8.9 °C

4 . 4 °C

1 0 0 4 . 6 hPa

1 6 . 1 kilometers

5:56
AM

51.1 °F/
10.6 °C

42.1 °F/
5.6 °C

6:56
AM

51.1 ° F /
10.6 °C

7:56
AM

2.1 m/s

71%

2 9 . 6 6 in /
1 0 0 4 . 4 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

South

3.5 mph /
5.6 km/h /
1.5 m/s

44.1 ° F /
6.7 °C

77%

2 9 . 6 9 In /
1 0 0 5 . 4 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

SW

4.6 mph /
7.4 km/h /
2.1 m/s

55.9 ° F /
1 3 . 3 °C

44.1 °F/
6.7 °C

64%

29.70 in /
1005.7 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNE

5.8 mph /
9.3 km/h /
2.6 m/s

8:56
AM

57.9 ° F /
1 4 . 4 °C

43.0 ° F /
6 . 1 °C

58%

2 9 . 7 1 in /
1 0 0 5 . 9 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

North

3.5 mph /
5.6 km/h /
1.5 m/s

9:56
AM

6 2 . 1 °F /
16.7 °C

43.0 ° F /
6 . 1 °C

50%

2 9 . 7 2 in /
1 0 0 6 . 2 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NW

8.1 mph /
13.0 km/h /
3.6 m/s

10:56
AM

64.0 ° F /
1 7 . 8 °C

45.0 ° F /
7.2 °C

50%

2 9 . 7 1 in /
1 0 0 6 . 0 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

10.4 mph /
16.7 km/h /
4.6 m/s

11:56
AM

68.0 ° F /
2 0 . 0 °C

46.9 °F/
8 . 3 °C

47%

2 9 . 7 3 in /
1 0 0 6 . 5 hPa

10.0 miles/
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

15.0 mph /
24.1 km/h /
6.7 m/s

12:56

7 0 . 0 °F /

PM

2 1 . 1 °C

45.0 ° F /
7.2 °C

41%

2 9 . 7 3 in /
1 0 0 6 . 7 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

15.0 mph /
24.1 km/h /
6.7 m/s

1:56
PM

72.0 ° F /
22.2 °C

44.1 °F/
6.7 °C

37%

2 9 . 7 4 in /
1 0 0 6 . 9 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

16.1 mph /
25.9 km/h /
7.2 m/s

2:56
PM

72.0 °F /
22.2 °C

43.0 ° F /
6.1 °C

35%

2 9 . 7 5 in /
1 0 0 7 . 5 hPa

10.0 miles/
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NW

1 9 . 6 mph /
3 1 . 5 km/h /
8.7 m/s

3:56
PM

73.0 °F /
22.8 °C

42.1 °F/
5.6 °C

33%

29.75 in /
1007.4 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

17.3 mph /
27.8 km/h /
7.7 m/s

4:56
PM

73.9 °F /
23.3 °C

39.9 ° F /
4 . 4 °C

29%

29.75 in/
1 0 0 7 . 5 hPa

10.0 miles/
1 6 . 1 kilometers

North

11.5 m p h /
18.5 km/h /
5.1 m/s

5:56
PM

73.9 ° F /
2 3 . 3 °C

41.0 ° F /
5.0 °C

30%

29.73 in /
1006.8 hPa

10.0 miles/
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

9.2 mph /
14.8 km/h /
4.1 m/s

6:56
PM

73.9 ° F /
23.3 °C

39.9 ° F /
4 . 4 °C

29%

2 9 . 7 3 in /
1 0 0 6 . 5 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NNW

8.1 mph /
13.0 km/h /
3.6 m/s

7:56
PM

72.0 °F /
22.2 °C

41.0 ° F /
5.0 °C

33%

2 9 . 7 3 in /
1 0 0 6 . 6 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NW

8.1 mph /
13.0 km/h /
3.6 m/s

8:56
PM

6 9 . 1 °F /
2 0 . 6 °C

43.0 ° F /
6.1 °C

39%

2 9 . 7 3 in /
1 0 0 6 . 7 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

NW

9.2 mph /
14.8 km/h /
4.1 m/s

9:56
PM

6 6 . 9 °F /
1 9 . 4 °C

44.1 °F/
6.7 °C

44%

29.75 in/
1 0 0 7 . 3 hPa

1 0 . 0 miles /
1 6 . 1 kilometers

WNW

6.9 mph /
1 1 . 1 km/h /
3 . 1 m/s

21.9
35.2
9.8 IT:

10:56
PM

64.9 ° F /
18.3 °C

43.0 ° F /
45%
6.1 °C

29.76 In /
1007.6 hPa

10.0 miles /
16.1 kilometers

South

4.6 mph /
7.4 km/h /
2.1 m/s

11:56
PM

62.1 °F/
16.7 °C

46.0 ° F /
7.8 °C

29.76 in /
1007.8 hPa

10.0 miles /
16.1 kilometers

SE

8.1 mph /
13.0 km/h /
3.6 m/s

56%
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R i s e and S e t f o r t h e Sun f o r

Astronomical
U. S. N a v a l O b s e r v a t o i
W a s h i n g t o n , DC 2 0 3 9 2 -

2005

20

M o u n t a i n S t a n d a r d Time

Jam .
Rise
h m
0752
0752
0752
0752
0752
0752
0752
0752
0751
0751
0751
0751
0750
0750
0749
0749
0749
0748
0747
0747
0746
0746
0745
0744
0743
0743
0742
0741
0740
0739
0738

Set
h m
1711
1712
1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1730
1731
1732
1733
1734
1736
1737
1738
1739
1741
1742
1743
1744

Feb.
Rise Set
h m h m
0737 1745
0736 1747
0735 1748
0734 1749
0733 1750
0732 1752
0731 1753
0730 1754
0729 1755
0727 1757
0726 1758
0725 1759
0724 1800
0722 1801
0721 1803
0720 1804
0718 1805
0717 1806
0716 1807
0714 1809
0713 1810
0711 1811
0710 1812
0709 1813
0707 1814
0706 1816
0704 1817
0703 1818

Mair.
Rise Set
h m h m
0701 1819
0700 1820
0658 1821
0656 1822
0655 1824
0653 1825
0652 1826
0650 1827
0648 1828
0647 1829
0645 1830
0644 1831
0642 1832
0640 1833
0639 1835
0637 1836
0635 1837
0634 1838
0632 1839
0630 1840
0629 1841
0627 1842
0625 1843
0624 1844
0622 1845
0620 1846
0619 1847
0617 1848
0616 1849
0614 1850
0612 1852

AF>r.
Rise Set
h m h m
0611 1853
0609 1854
0607 1855
0606 1856
0604 1857
0602 1858
0601 1859
0559 1900
0558 1901
0556 1902
0555 1903
0553 1904
0551 1905
0550 1906
0548 1907
0547 1908
0545 1909
0544 1910
0542 1911
0541 1912
0539 1914
0538 1915
0537 1916
0535 1917
0534 1918
0532 1919
0531 1920
0530 1921
0528 1922
0527 1923

May
Rise Set
h m h m
0526 1924
0524 1925
0523 1926
0522 1927
0521 1928
0520 1929
0518 1930
0517 1931
0516 1932
0515 1933
0514 1934
0513 1935
0512 1936
0511 1937
0510 1938
0509 1939
0508 1940
0507 1941
0506 1942
0506 1943
0505 1944
0504 1945
0503 1946
0503 1946
0502 1947
0501 1948
0501 1949
0500 1950
0500 1951
0459 1951
0459 1952

June
Rise Set
h m h m
0458 1953
0458 1954
0457 1954
0457 1955
0457 1956
0457 1956
0456 1957
0456 1957
0456 1958
0456 1958
0456 1959
0456 1959
0456 2000
0456 2000
0456 2001
0456 2001
0456 2001
0456 2002
0456 2002
0456 2002
0456 2002
0457 2002
0457 2003
0457 2003
0457 2003
0458 2003
0458 2003
0459 2003
0459 2003
0500 2003

July
Rise Set
h m h m
0500 2003
0501 2002
0501 2002
0502 2002
0502 2002
0503 2001
0503 2001
0504 2001
0505 2000
0505 2000
0506 2000
0507 1959
0508 1958
0508 1958
0509 1957
0510 1957
0511 1956
0512 1955
0512 1955
0513 1954
0514 1953
0515 1952
0516 1951
0517 1951
0518 1950
0519 1949
0520 1948
0520 1947
0521 1946
0522 1945
0523 1944

Aug.
Rise Set
h m h m
0524 1943
0525 1942
0526 1940
0527 1939
0528 1938
0529 1937
0530 1936
0531 1934
0532 1933
0533 1932
0534 1931
0535 1929
0536 1928
0537 1926
0538 1925
0539 1924
0540 1922
0541 1921
0542 1919
0543 1918
0544 1916
0545 1915
0546 1913
0547 1912
0548 1910
0549 1909
0550 1907
0551 1906
0552 1904
0553 1902
0554 1901

Seipt.
Rise Set
h m h m
0555 1859
0556 1858
0557 1856
0558 1854
0559 1853
0600 1851
0601 1849
0602 1848
0602 1846
0603 1844
0604 1843
0605 1841
0606 1839
0607 1838
0608 1836
0609 1834
0610 1833
0611 1831
0612 1829
0613 1828
0614 1826
0615 1824
0616 1822
0617 1821
0618 1819
0619 1817
0620 1816
0621 1814
0622 1812
0623 1811

Add one hour for d a y l i g h t time, i f and when in u s e .

Oct.
Rise Set
h m h m
0624 1809
0625 1807
0626 1806
0627 1804
0628 1803
0629 1801
0630 1759
0632 1758
0633 1756
0634 1755
0635 1753
0636 1751
0637 1750
0638 1748
0639 1747
0640 1745
0641 1744
0642 1742
0643 1741
0645 1739
0646 1738
0647 1736
0648 1735
0649 1734
0650 1732
0651 1731
0652 1730
0654 1728
0655 1727
0656 1726
0657 1725

Nov.
Rise Set
h m h m
0658 1723
0659 1722
0701 1721
0702 1720
0703 1719
0704 1718
0705 1717
0706 1716
0708 1715
0709 1714
0710 1713
0711 1712
0712 1711
0714 1710
0715 1709
0716 1708
0717 1708
0718 1707
0719 1706
0721 1705
0722 1705
0723 1704
0724 1704
0725 1703
0726 1703
0727 1702
0728 1702
0729 1701
0731 1701
0732 1701

Dei C .
Rise Set
h m h m
0733 1701
0734 1700
0735 1700
0736 1700
0737 1700
0737 1700
0738 1700
0739 1700
0740 1700
0741 1700
0742 1700
0743 1700
0743 1700
0744 1701
0745 1701
0745 1701
0746 1702
0747 1702
0747 1702
0748 1703
0748 1703
0749 1704
0749 1704
0750 1705
0750 1706
0750 1706
0751 1707
0751 1708
0751 1708
0751 1709
0752 1710
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. ROBIE JOSEPH DALRYMPLE
CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-206 - NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: December 06, 2005 Not Guilty
Disposition: March 30, 2006 Guilty
Charge 2 - 76-5-206 - NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: December 06, 2005 Not Guilty
Disposition: March 30, 2006 Guilty
Charge 3 - 76-5-206 - NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: December 06, 2005 Not Guilty
Disposition: March 30, 2006 Guilty

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
JUDITH S ATHERTON
PARTIES
Defendant - ROBIE JOSEPH DALRYMPLE
Represented by: J KEVIN MURPHY
Plaintiff -

STATE OF UTAH

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: ROBIE JOSEPH DALRYMPLE
Date of Birth: November 03, 1964
Jail Booking Number:
Law Enforcement Agency: UHP - Salt Lake City
LEA Case Number:
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: 05018138
Sheriff Office Number:
Violation Date: June 18, 2005 7200 WEST 1-80
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

71.25
71.25
0.00
0.00

Printed: 03/07/07 14:01:58
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CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
15.00
Amount Paid:
15.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
15.00
Amount Paid:
15.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.25
1.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
15.00
Amount Paid:
15.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
15.00
Amount Paid:
15.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
10.00
Amount Paid:
10.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
CASE NOTE
DAO

05018138

defendant not booked on summons as per JEMS.

PROCEEDINGS
10-04-05
10-04-05
10-04-05
10-04-05
10-04-05

Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned.
Case filed
Filed: Information
Note: CASE FILED BY SGT LGWEHRLI OF UHP SUMMONS ISSUED
ARRAIGNMENT - SUMMONS scheduled on December 06, 2005 at 09:00
AM in Arraignment - S31 with Judge ARRAIGNMENT.
10-04-05 Issued: Summons

Printed: 03/07/07 14:01:58
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CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor

Judge ARRAIGNMENT ARRAIGNMENT
Hearing Date: December 05, 2005
Time: 09:00
10-13-05 Filed return: RETURN OF SERVICE ON SUMMONS. LEFT WITH ATTORNEY
KEVIN MURPHY.
Party Served: DALRYMPLE, ROBIE JOSEPH
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: October 11, 2005
11-01-05 Filed: Appearance of Counsel, Entry of Not Guilty Plea, Jury
Demand, and Motion for Discovery filed by J Kevin Murphy,
Attorney for Defendant
11-01-05 Filed: Response to Request for Discovery filed by Patricia S
Cassell, Deputy DA
12-06-05 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on February 21, 2006 at 02:00 PM
in Fourth Floor - S4 5 with Judge ATHERTON.
12-06-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment
Judge:
JUDITH S ATHERTON
PRESENT
Clerk:
sunshinb
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN

Video
Tape Number:

Disk 73

Tape Count: 9:20:27

ARRAIGNMENT
Defendant waives reading of Information.
Defendant is arraigned.
Counsel stipulate to waive the appearance of the Defendant today,
he lives in Alabama. Defense counsel waives any speedy trial
issues.
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled.
Date: 02/21/2006
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON
12-06-05 Judge ATHERTON assigned.
12-06-05 Note: Defendant to be present at Pre-Trial Conference. Issue of
defendant reporting to ADC for book and release on summons to
be resolved at Pre-Trial Conference
12-09-05 Note: Bail remain Summons (not yet booked).
02-21-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference
Judge:
JUDITH S ATHERTON
PRESENT

Printed: 03/07/07 14:02:01
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CASE NUMBER 051906928 Other Misdemeanor

Clerk:
sunshinb
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN
Video
Tape Count: 2:37
HEARING
COUNT: 2:37
Defendant is requesting a Bench Trial. Defendant is to go to the
jail and be booked and released to Pretrial Services with the
understanding that the release will be the defendant just checking
in since he does not live in this State. Case continued.
1 DAY BENCH TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 03/30/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON
02-21-06 1 DAY BENCH TRIAL scheduled on March 30, 2006 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - S4 5 with Judge ATHERTON.
03-10-06 Filed: Stipulated Exhibit List
03-24-06 Filed: Stipulated Exhibit List for Trial 3-30-06 Defendant's
Motion with supporting memorandum and Trial Memorandum.
03-29-06 Filed: Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum
03-30-06 Received: March 30, 2006
Container: 2-VERY LARGE ENVELOPES 2-CHARTS Location: 2-VLE
2-CHARTS
03-30-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Trial
Judge:
JUDITH S ATHERTON
PRESENT
Clerk:
sunshinb
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN
Video
Tape Count: 9:26
Defendant waives time for sentence.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence
report.
TRIAL
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COUNT: 9:26
Defendant waives reading of the information. Opening statements
by the defense. Opening statements by the State. Exclusionary
rule invoked. 9:33 Jason Hunter is sworn and testifies. State's
exhibits #1,2,3,4,5,6 and 7 is offered and received.
Cross-examination. Re-direct. Re-cross. 10:32 William Paul
Dunford is sworn and testifies. Cross-examination. 10:51 Greg
Rowberry is sworn and testifies. Cross-examination. 11:15 Jerry
Workman is sworn and testifies. Cross-examination. Re-direct.
Re-cross. 11:27 Richard Beveridge is sworn and testifies.
Cross-examination. Defendant's exhibit #1 is offered and admitted.
Re-direct. Re-cross. State Rests. Defendant's motion to dismiss
is denied. Defendant waives his right to testify.
Defense does not wish to call any witnesses. Closing statements
by the State. Closing statements from the defense. The Court
finds the defendant guilty on all counts as stated on the record.
Ms. Cassell to prepare a findings of facts.
SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 06/09/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S45
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON
03-30-06 SENTENCING scheduled on June 09, 2006 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - S4 5 with Judge ATHERTON.
03-30-06 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty
03-30-06 Charge 2 Disposition is Guilty
03-30-06 Charge 3 Disposition is Guilty
03-30-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
15.00
03-30-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
15.00
Note: 20.00 cash tendered.
5.00 change given.
03-30-06 Filed: Exhibit List
04-14-06 Filed: Stipulated Motion and Order for Pre-Sentence Interview
by Telephone (DENIED)
04-20-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
15.00
04-20-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
15.00
04-26-06 Filed: Def's proposedm findings of fact
05-11-06 Filed: Stipulation to Continue Sentencing Date
05-17-06 Filed order: Findings of Fact
Judge jatherto
Signed May 17, 2006
05-25-06 SENTENCING rescheduled on August 08, 2006 at 09:00 AM
Reason: Stipulation of counsel.
05-30-06 Filed: Letter to the Court from William Prince (SEALED)
07-01-06 Judge BARRETT assigned.
07-06-06 Filed: Transcript of Bench Trial dated 3-30-06, Carolyn
Erickson, CCT
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07-10-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.25
07-10-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.25
07-21-06 Filed: Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment and
alternative Motion for Conviction of Lower Degree of Offense
with Supporting Memorandum
07-21-06 Filed: Notice of Submission of Trial Transcript
08-03-06 Filed: Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Arrest
of Judgement
08-04-06 Filed: AP&P Presentence Report
08-07-06 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for
Arrest of Judgement and Alternative Motion for Conviction of
Lower Degree of Offense
08-08-06 Judge ATHERTON assigned.
08-08-06 Tracking started for Probation (Other). Review date Aug 08,
2009.
08-08-06 Tracking started for Community Service. Review date Aug 08,
2009.
08-08-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME
Judge:
JUDITH S ATHERTON
PRESENT
Clerk:
sunshinb
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, J KEVIN
Video
Tape Count: 9:15:21
HEARING
COUNT: 9:15:21
Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgement and Alternative Motion
for Conviction of Lower Degree of Offense is Denied.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE a Class A
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
to run consecutive to each other
COMMUNITY SERVICE
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Complete 500 hour(s) of community service.
Community service is to be completed by August 8, 2009.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by GOOD BEHAVIOR PROBATION.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no laws.
Defendant is to surrender his Commercial Drivers License.
08- 15-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
15.00
08- 15-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
15.00
08- 15-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
15.00
08- 15-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
15.00
08- 15-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
10.00
08- 15-06 AUDIO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
10.00
09- 07-06 Filed: Defendant's Notice of Appeal
09- 11-06 Note: Cert/Copy of Defendant's Notice of Appeal forwarded to
Utah Court of Appeals
09- 13-06 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals Letter to J. Kevin Murphy - the
notice of appeal in this case has been filed with the Utah
Court of Appeals - 20060827-CA
09- 18-06 Filed: Defendant/Appellant's Certificate that No Transcript is
Required (Trial Transcript Previously Filed in Trial Court)
09- 19-06 Note: Cert/Copy of Defendant/Appellant's Certificate that No
Transcript is Required (Trial Transcript Previously Filed in
Trial Court) - forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals - 20060827-CA
10- 10-06 Note: INDEXED
10- 10-06 Note: Cert/Copy of Record Index forwarded to Utah Court of
Appeals - 20060827-CA
10- 10-06 Note: Record forwarded to Utah Court of Appeals - Files-2,
Tran-1, Exh-1 envelope - paginated - 20060827-CA
12- 12-06 Filed: Utah Court Of Appeals - Order of Dismissal - 20060827-CA
02- 12-07 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Remittitur Received - Record
Received - Files-2, Tran-1, Exh-1 envelope - paginated - Appeal
Dismissed - 20060827-CA
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